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Krapp’s Last Tape and the Beckettian mimesis of 
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Perhaps no drama more deserves to be called a ‘memory play’ 
(to invoke Ruby Cohn’s designation) than Krapp’s Last Tape—
a play which, through pairing the aged Krapp with what Martin 
Esslin terms an ‘autobiographical library of annual recorded 
statements’, unfolds a series of rememorations.1 In this regard, 
Krapp’s Last Tape, like The Glass Menagerie as described by 
its author, Tennessee Williams, appears as a work in which 
nostalgia is ‘the first condition’.2 This impression is reinforced 
by the abundant connections, expertly charted by James 
Knowlson, between the lives of Krapp and Samuel Beckett, his 
author.3 The relentless emphasis, in Krapp’s Last Tape, on 
memory as the agent of negative retrospection on life has 
prompted many critics to construe the play in generically 
mimetic terms, and hence to interpret Krapp as the Beckettian 
version of Everyman. For example, according to Joseph Smith, 
the play treats ‘the question whether any life can be said to have 
been lived for other than naught’.4 According to Anthony 
Kubiak, the play consummates the mimetic tradition of 
‘Western drama’, with respect to the inevitability of ‘pain, 
failure, and hopelessness’ in life.5 Daniel Katz transposes this 
universalizing tendency to a more theoretical plane, by 
interpreting Krapp in poststructuralist terms as a representation 
of ‘the interminable denial of subjective appropriation which 
makes up “Not I”.’6  
 
But to construe the play, in generically mimetic terms, as the 
representation of some aspect or quality universally applicable 
to human life is to construe Krapp’s plight, at age sixty-nine, as 
irreversibly inevitable, and not as one which could, by any 
means, be averted. In such interpretation, Krapp cannot be 
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judged responsible for his predicament; for its cause concerns 
the intrinsic nature of life, not the intrinsic nature of Krapp. Yet, 
the upshot of such interpretation is to suppress or obscure the 
moral dimension of the play—a dimension memorably 
formulated, in another context, by Matthew Arnold, as entailing 
the question of ‘[h]ow to live’, how to apply ‘ideas to life’, so 
that life is not ‘abandoned to passion or allowed to drift at 
hazard’.7 But in thus demanding the avoidance of 
irresponsibility, the moral question of how to live presupposes 
the recognition of responsibility—the obligation, that is, to 
direct life toward its proper goal, however defined.  
The moral dimension is not only fundamental to Krapp’s 
Last Tape, but also fundamentally ambiguous. From one 
perspective, Krapp displays irresponsibility, in becoming the 
victim of his own psychological mechanism or habitual attitude 
to life, which reduces his existence to the state of regret, 
regarding the one event which he obsessively remembers: ‘Be 
again, be again. (Pause.) All that old misery. (Pause.) Once 
wasn’t enough for you. (Pause.) Lie down across her’ (pp. 26-
7). Yet from another perspective, through precisely this lapse 
into regret, Krapp displays responsibility, by conducting his life 
to the Beckettian goal of abandonment—a state of vacancy 
beyond the reach of regret: ‘Regretting, that’s what helps you 
on . . . regretting what is, regretting what was . . . that’s what 
transports you, towards the end of regretting’ (The Unnamable, 
p. 371). Ironically, neither alternative confirms the conventional 
view that the play represents the futility of life. If Krapp is 
construed in terms of irresponsibility, then his plight, by 
definition, cannot be attributed to universally impinging forces 
over which he has no control. But if Krapp is construed in terms 
of responsibility and successful achievement of the Beckettian 
goal, then his plight cannot be deemed an example of ‘failure, 
and hopelessness’ (to retrieve Kubiak’s characterization, cited 
earlier).  
The ambiguity of Krapp’s predicament, with respect to the 
alternatives of irresponsibility and responsibility, is epitomized 
by the time indicated in the stage directions. Though the 
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accumulated tapes suggest Krapp’s concern with the past, and 
though his observance of this particular birthday (his sixty-
ninth) emphasizes his situation in the present, the first stage 
direction of the play indicates ‘A late evening in the future’ (p. 
9, my emphasis). Since Krapp is in a present that rememorates 
various pasts, the designation of an evening in the future 
becomes problematic. But the problem can be solved when we 
realize that the temporal designation is not chronological but 
symbolic. That is, it indicates, not a date not yet reached on a 
calendar, but an inevitability toward which Krapp is always 
tending. But is this inevitability due to factors which Krapp 
cannot control or to factors for which he is responsible? On the 
one hand, as we shall explore, Krapp’s predicament seems to 
stem from the mentality or perspective on life which he 
embodies at any age, but which in principle he could modify. 
On the other hand, Krapp appears caught in a cycle whose 
momentum cannot be altered. The locus classicus of the 
Beckettian notion of unalterable inevitability occurs in Molloy: 
‘And what I saw was more like a crumbling, a frenzied 
collapsing of all that had always protected me from all I was 
always condemned to be.’8 A similar formulation appears in 
Waiting for Godot: ‘The essential doesn’t change.’9 An 
analogue occurs in Company: ‘And you as you always were. 
Alone.’ 10  
The first alternative—irresponsibility or failure properly to 
address the problem of how to live—can be introduced by 
contrasting the view of age in Krapp’s Last Tape with that in 
Samuel Johnson’s Rasselas. Our intention here is simply to 
foreground an important aspect of Beckett’s play, not to adduce 
any theories of literary influence on Beckett’s work—though, 
as Knowlson indicates, Beckett conceived, in late 1936, the 
never executed plan of writing a play concerning Dr. Johnson 
and Mrs Thrale.11 Rasselas begins with the admonition that 
disappointment in life is inevitable; for age cannot ‘perform the 
promises of youth’:  
Ye who listen with credulity to the whispers of fancy, and 
persue with eagerness the phantoms of hope; who expect that 
age will perform the promises of youth, and that the 
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deficiencies of the present day will be supplied by the morrow; 
attend to the history of Rasselas prince of Abissinia.12  
 
To Johnson, the problem of unhappiness in old age is generic. 
The individual bears no responsibility for it. But from the point 
of view which we shall now adopt, this is not the situation in 
Krapp’s Last Tape, where Krapp’s plight results from his own 
choices. Here, to invoke the Heracleitean dictum, character is 
man’s fate.13 
The notion of deficient self-control and failure to assume 
responsibility for one’s actions is localized in Krapp’s relation 
to bananas (though critics who discuss the bananas treat them as 
phallic symbols, ultimately indicative of Krapp’s masturbatory 
narcissism).14 Despite repeated resolutions over the years to 
‘Cut ’em out!’ (p. 14), Krapp continues gorging: ‘Have just 
eaten I regret to say three bananas and only with difficulty 
refrained from a fourth’ (p. 14). Ironically, the compulsiveness 
of Krapp’s banana bulimia is conspicuously analogous to the 
compulsiveness of his rememoration. Moreover, his much 
emphasized discarding of banana peels is obviously analogous 
to his tendency to reject or forget memories.15 He ‘nearly falls’ 
after treading on the first skin, and then ‘finally pushes it, still 
stooping, with his foot over the edge of stage into pit’ (p. 11). 
After peeling the second banana, he ‘tosses skin into pit’ (p. 
11). He treats memories in the same way as he treats banana 
skins. No longer interested in rememorating the year just 
concluded, Krapp first discards the envelope on which he has 
scrawled his notes (‘Crumples it and throws it away’ [p. 24, my 
emphasis]), and then discards the tape on which he is recording, 
so that he might gorge once more on the more distant memory 
of the girl in the punt: ‘He suddenly bends over machine, 
switches off, wrenches off tape, throws it away, puts on the 
other, winds it forward to the passage he wants, switches on, 
listens staring front’ (p. 27, my emphasis). 
The problem of disposal common to bananas and memories 
suggests that, like bananas, memories are ‘‘[f]atal things for a 
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man with [Krapp’s] condition’ (p. 14); for compulsive 
consumption of them constipates his life: ‘What’s a year now? 
The sour cud and the iron stool’ (p. 25). Here movement toward 
the future is formulated in terms of preoccupation with the past: 
‘These old P.M.s are gruesome, but I often find them—(Krapp 
switches off, broods, switches on)—a help before embarking on 
a new . . . (hesitates) . . . retrospect’ (p. 16). Krapp’s relation to 
memory entails a further paradox. On the one hand, Krapp’s life 
is a repudiating of his own previous or earlier selves and their 
respective experiences: ‘Well out of that, Jesus yes!’ (p. 17); 
‘Just been listening to that stupid bastard I took myself for 
thirty years ago, hard to believe I was ever as bad as that. Thank 
God that’s all done with anyway’ (p. 24). This disposal of the 
past seems to serve the project of advancing toward fulfillment 
in the future: ‘Perhaps my best years are gone. When there was 
a chance of happiness. But I wouldn’t want them back. Not 
with the fire in me now. No, I wouldn’t want them back’ (p. 
28). But on the other hand, the consequence of discarding the 
past is eventually to reduce life to regret (‘drowned in dreams’ 
[p. 25]), with the result, to interpolate Beckett’s words from 
Proust, that Krapp is ‘present at his own absence’.16 
From this perspective, Krapp does indeed appear 
irresponsible, in his failure to control a pattern of thought which 
dooms him to nostalgia. Originally, as we have seen, Krapp’s 
retrospective project was not to return to the past, but to define 
his identity through the annual progression of perspectives on 
the past. But eventually this retrospective project backfires such 
that Krapp has no identity but through regretting the past and 
abdicating responsibility to identify through striving toward the 
future:  
Sometimes wondered if a last effort mightn’t—(Pause.) Ah 
finish your booze now and get to your bed. Go on with this 
drivel in the morning. Or leave it at that. (Pause.) Lie propped 
up in the dark—and wander. Be again in the dingle on a 
Christmas Eve, gathering holly, the red-berried. All that old 
misery. (p. 26)  
Sydney Studies 
56 
Yet from another perspective, Krapp’s relation to memory 
enables him to evade the great hazard enunciated in the theory 
of life which Beckett formulates in his study of Proust, already 
cited.  
In this theory, often summarized by critics, the life of an 
individual is governed by habits or routine patterns of existence 
which sustain their own continuity, and enable the individual to 
adapt to his or her environment, until disrupted by a period of 
transition, during which ‘for a moment the boredom of living is 
replaced by the suffering of being’.17 Here, Beckett construes 
life in terms of a process of decantation whereby the habits and 
forms of life established by the individual in the past must 
inevitably yield to changing circumstances and conditions in 
the future:  
The individual is the seat of a constant process of decantation, 
decantation from the vessel containing the fluid of future time, 
sluggish, pale and monochrome, to the vessel containing the 
fluid of past time, agitated and multicoloured by the 
phenomena of its hours.18  
As a result of the continual impingement of change and the 
need to adapt to it, life is here construed as ‘a succession of 
habits, since the individual is a succession of individuals . . . ’ 
(my emphasis).19 
It is obvious, as Esslin has noted, that the annual tapes 
recorded by Krapp foreground this notion of the individual as a 
succession of individuals.20 But it has never before been 
noticed that Krapp’s Last Tape actually stages the process of 
temporal decantation wherein, according to the passage from 
Proust already cited, this succession finds its originating cause. 
On three occasions, Krapp disappears ‘backstage into darkness 
(pp. 12, 17, 24), where he is heard uncorking bottles and 
decanting their contents: ‘Sound of bottle against glass, then 
brief siphon’ (p. 24). Significantly, on each of these occasions, 
the passage of time is emphasized: ‘Ten seconds. Loud pop of 
cork. Fifteen seconds’ (p. 12). The link between the passage of 
time and decantation is reinforced by Krapp’s habit of 
Krapp’s Last Tape 
57 
consulting his prominently displayed ‘[h]eavy silver watch’ (p. 
9) just before each trip backstage to decant (pp. 10, 17, 23).  
Ironically, Krapp himself constitutes a dramatic refutation or, 
more precisely, counter example of the theory of life which 
Beckett expressed in Proust. For in the play, character finally 
supersedes the ‘constant process of decantation’ which 
individual identity necessarily undergoes. Here we reach the 
deeper significance of the play’s title. The notion of life as 
succession is displaced by the notion of life as regression. 
There will be no more tapes, not because Krapp will not live 
another year (as Vivian Mercier suggests), but because Krapp 
has found a way to overcome the process of decantation 
whereby, through the passage of time, the individual becomes a 
succession of individuals.21 By fixating exclusively on past 
moments, Krapp reduces the present to the site of 
rememoration, and thus fortifies his life against change. 
Through regretting the past that can never return, Krapp renders 
the future irrelevant. This is his last tape, because there will 
never be anything new to record: ‘Leave it at that’ (p. 26). 
Originally, the purpose of ‘retrospect’ (p. 16) was to mark 
annual progress away from the past: ‘Well out of that, Jesus 
yes!’ (p. 17); ‘Thank God that’s all done with anyway’ (p. 24). 
But now the only retrospect concerns the importunity of regret: 
‘Be again, be again’ (p. 26). In discarding the new tape 
(‘wrenches off the tape, throws it away’ [p. 27]), Krapp 
discards the very process by which he confirms his identity as a 
succession of individuals. Henceforth, he will be himself only 
through interrogating his loss: ‘Could have been happy with 
her, up there on the Baltic, and the pines, and the dunes. 
(Pause.) Could I?’ (p. 25).  
By this means, Krapp triumphs over the decantation of time, 
as defined in Beckett’s Proust. This triumph can be clarified 
through examination of the scene which Krapp most 
obsessively rememorates—the one concerning the girl in the 
punt:  
We drifted in among the flags and stuck. The way they went 
down, sighing, before the stem! (Pause.) I lay down across her 
Sydney Studies 
58 
with my face in her breasts and my hand on her. We lay there 
without moving. But under us all moved, and moved us, 
gently, up and down, and from side to side. (p. 27)  
The passage narrates a remarkable opposition between flux and 
immobility. Krapp and the girl are unmoving, but beneath them 
‘all moved’. A related opposition closes the play, as Krapp sits 
‘motionless,’ while ‘[t]he tape runs on in silence’ (p. 28). Here 
Krapp makes love to motionlessness in his life, by giving all his 
passion to regret.  
Further analysis of this opposition between motion and 
motionlessness will clarify the implications of regret in the 
play. As a character, Krapp is positioned between two 
principles of movement: one concrete (the tapes revolving in 
the tape recorder), the other abstract (the passage of time, 
suggested, as we have seen, by both the setting ‘in the future’ 
and the repeated action of decantation). Recourse to the tape 
recorder is the primary means by which Krapp negates the 
movement of time. He does this not merely by focusing on the 
past in order to ignore the movement of time toward the future. 
More profoundly, the tapes enable him to replace continuity 
with atomicity—to replace, that is, the experience of time as an 
unbroken flow of becoming with the experience of time as a 
series of discrete, disposable parts, which can be discarded or 
rememorated at will: ‘Happiest moment of the past half million’ 
(p. 25). In his earlier phases, Krapp construed life as a series of 
escapes from involvement, with either a loved one (‘Well out of 
that, Jesus yes!’ [p. 17]) or his own emotional turmoil: ‘Thank 
God that’s all done with anyway’ (p. 24). The hidden motive of 
the tape recording ritual is to detach Krapp from implication in 
the continuity of his own life, by reducing it to a series of 
disposable and fixed memories whose relation to the present 
Krapp, as he moves through time, can always be repudiated. 
Conversely, by fixating on one of those memories, Krapp 
repudiates his very location in the present.  
This paradoxical project to repudiate the past by discarding 
memories, and to repudiate the present by obsessive 
remembering, entails a remarkable deconstruction of the theory 
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of life as a succession of individuals, which Beckett formulated 
in Proust. As typified by his response to his mother’s death, 
Krapp’s reaction, after completing every stage of his life, is 
relief that it is ‘All over and done with, at last’ (p. 20). By this 
means, he reduces life to the mere succession of moments 
(‘Moments. Her moments, my moments. The dog’s moments’ 
[p. 20]), but without the excruciating intervals of transition 
when, according to the schema in Proust, ‘the boredom of 
living is replaced by the suffering of being’. Yet at the end of 
the play, as Krapp sits ‘motionless’ while ‘[t]he tape runs on in 
silence’ (p. 28), it becomes apparent that his ultimate project is 
not merely to reduce life to a succession of moments without 
the inconveniently intervening intervals postulated in Proust, 
but to empty time of the succession of moments by which its 
movement, according to that essay, is punctuated. Thus, 
through regret, Krapp simulates a state where time is no longer 
threatening, because its movement is divested of succession, 
and simply perpetuates the same unchanging preoccupation. He 
discards women (‘living on and off with Bianca in Kedar street’ 
[p. 16]) just as he discards his past selves. But this refusal of 
continuity, with either himself or others, is precisely the factor 
that inevitably makes his life prey to the futility of regret.22 
 
Yet in the Beckettian universe, a paradoxical transvaluation 
of values occurs, such that futility becomes the only valid goal. 
Indeed, in an utterance that could serve as Krapp’s epitaph, the 
Unnamable explicitly posits futility as a raison d’etre: ‘No, one 
can spend one’s life thus, unable to live, unable to bring to life, 
and die in vain, having done nothing, been nothing’ (Un, p. 
358). The Beckettian protagonist is always ‘a monster of the 
solitudes’ (How It Is, p. 13), and Beckett’s minimalist art 
always concerns ‘the little that’s left of the little whereby man 
continues’ (How It Is, p. 26): ‘as if to grow less could help, ever 
less and less and never quite be gone’ (Texts for Nothing).23 In 
this context, to assess Krapp on the conventional ‘moral plane’ 
(How It Is, p. 57) is a labour in irrelevance. For in Beckettian 
terms, through enduring the decantation of time by which he is 
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‘aged out of recognition’ (How It Is, p. 107), Krapp is simply a 
Beckettian ‘paradigm of human kind’ (Texts for Nothing, p. 
108), suffering ‘in obedience to the unintelligible terms of an 
incomprehensible damnation’ (Un, p. 308). Ineluctably, in the 
Beckettian universe, existence is ‘senseless, speechless, 
issueless misery’ (Molloy, p. 13).  
 The relation of Krapp’s Last Tape to the conditions 
prevailing in the Beckettian universe can reveal the 
undiscovered implications of the stage directions concluding 
the play: ‘Krapp motionless staring before him. The tape runs 
on in silence’ (p. 28). As the couple in Ohio Impromptu, Krapp 
is now ‘Buried in who knows what profounds of mind.’24 
Indeed, Paul Lawley has noted that the relation between ‘the 
taped voice of Krapp-at-thirty-nine’ and ‘Krapp-at-sixty-nine’ 
corresponds to that between Reader and Listener in Ohio 
Impromptu.25 In this circumstance, lapsed in silence indefinitely 
prolonged, Krapp approaches the Beckettian ideal as formulated 
in The Unnamable:  
I don’t mind failing, it’s a pleasure, but I want to go silent. Not 
as just now, the better to listen, but peacefully, victorious, 
without ulterior object. Then it would be a life worth having, a 
life at last (Un, p. 310). 
As ‘[t]he tape runs on in silence’, it is almost as if Krapp were 
listening to a recording of silence: listening, that is, to a 
transcription of ultimate reality in the Beckettian universe: ‘And 
the ticking of an invisible alarm-clock was as the voice of that 
silence which, like the dark, would one day triumph too. And 
then all would be still and dark and all things at rest for ever at 
last’ (Malone, p. 203).   
Hence, Krapp remains a radically ambiguous character. In 
terms of the eudaemonistic assumption that the supreme task in 
life is to achieve ‘happiness’ (pp. 16, 28), Krapp is a dismal 
failure. But viewed in terms of the Beckettian ideal regarding 
silence ‘without ulterior object’ (Un, p. 310), wherein ‘all 
things [are] at rest for ever at last’ (Malone, p. 203), Krapp 
achieves resounding success. For in that silence, lost in reverie 
about the punt experience which the recorded voice intoned, it 
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almost seems as if Krapp has fulfilled the Beckettian narrator’s 
project to become him whom the words recall: ‘Will they 
succeed in slipping me into him, the memory and dream of me, 
into him still living . . . ’ (Texts for Nothing, p. 134). In that 
impossible circumstance, silence is the supreme—and indeed 
only—felicity: ‘it will be the silence . . . the lasting one’ (Un, p. 
414). To apply Malone’s words, Krapp here approaches ‘the 
blessedness of absence’ (Malone, p. 222). For in the nostalgia 
induced by ‘old words back from the dead’ (to invoke Bom’s 
apt formula in How It Is, p. 95), Krapp is not here and now; he 
is only there and then.  
Yet, at bottom, what Krapp wants is not the return of the 
past, but the passionate abandon of the present to the 
importunity of ‘retrospect’: ‘Once wasn’t enough for you. 
(Pause.) Lie down across her’ (pp. 16, 27). In this context, the 
irony of Krapp’s relation with Fanny, the ‘[b]ony old ghost of a 
whore’ emerges: ‘I told her I’d been saving up for her all my 
life’ (pp. 25, 26). Through reducing his life to a series of 
retrospects on discarded selves and relationships, Krapp tends 
inevitably toward the stage where all that remains is regret. But 
through that regret, epitomized by obsessive rememoration of 
lovemaking in the canoe, Krapp gives all his yearning to 
ghosts—to the perseveration, that is, of moments long departed, 
whose rememoration Krapp pursues with more consistency of 
attachment than he ever gave to anything or anyone in the past. 
In this sense, he has indeed been saving up for ghosts all his 
life, allocating to dead moments a fidelity which he never 
accorded to living ones: ‘Thank God that’s all done with 
anyway’ (p. 24). As Dr. Johnson wrote in an Idler essay, ‘he to 
whom the present offers nothing will often be looking 
backward on the past.’26 But in Krapp’s case, the present offers 
nothing precisely because his deepest wish is to be ‘a memory 
come alive’ (to borrow a phrase from Kafka’s Diaries: 1914-
1923).27 Krapp’s need is to have no life but rememorating the 
one(s) that he rejected—a project epitomized by the narrator of 
‘Enough’: ‘It is then I shall have lived then or never’.28 The 
only way for Krapp to be free of attachment is to be attached, 
through regret, to loss.  
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Krapp’s failure to find fulfilment through the forward 
movement of life can be clarified through reference to Waiting 
for Godot. Whereas in Krapp’s Last Tape the refusal of forward 
movement is expressed through regretting a past that will never 
return, in Waiting for Godot it is expressed through waiting for 
a future that will never happen or arrive. The future will never 
happen, because it already has happened, as evident in 
Estragon’s amplification of his observation regarding ‘Another 
day done with’: ‘For me it’s over and done with, no matter what 
happens’ (p. 38). Whereas Krapp focuses on events already 
concluded, Estragon focuses inevitable conclusion. By opposite 
means, each rejects the notion of novelty in life—an attitude 
articulated in the opening sentence of Murphy: ‘The sun shone, 
having no alternative, on the nothing new.’29 In consequence, 
all that remains is repetition, as epitomized in Krapp’s 
imperative, ‘Be again’ (p. 26).  
In this context, Krapp’s immunity to moral evaluation is 
confirmed. For his recourse to regret here appears not as a 
character fault, but as ‘[a]n automatic adjustment of the human 
organism to the conditions of its existence . . . ’ (to retrieve a 
formula from Proust).30 In the Beckettian universe, reality is 
reduced to recurring cycle which prevents creative advance: 
‘the endless April showers and the crocuses and then the whole 
bloody business starting all over again’ (Watt).31 Viewed from 
this angle, Krapp’s regret results not so much from choice as 
from mechanical and involuntary adaptation to the unavoidable 
circumstances of life. Indeed, the mechanical aspect of Krapp is 
suggested by his close relation with his ‘machine’ (p. 13), the 
tape-recorder. In fact, as Paul Lawley points out, Beckett 
instructed the actor, Pierre Chabert, to ‘[b]ecome as much as 
possible one with the machine’.32  
But, regardless of such emphasis, Krapp is a man, not a 
machine—one who has abdicated responsibility to control his 
own compulsion toward mechanical repetition, with respect to 
both bananas and the recourse to rememoration which, as we 
have seen, they symbolize. Indeed, as noted earlier with respect 
to his banana bulimia, Krapp himself acknowledges his failure 
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to control compulsive consumption: ‘Cut ’em out!’ (p. 14). But 
his resolution soon lapses. Indeed, Krapp’s frequent intervals of 
vacuity are prominently associated with the very bananas which 
he undertakes to forswear. For example, twice on the same page 
the same description of his action is repeated: ‘puts end of 
banana in his mouth and remains motionless, staring vacuously 
before him’ (p. 11). Virtually the same description pertains to 
Krapp’s immersion in nostalgia at the end of the play: ‘Krapp 
motionless staring before him’, as the ‘tape runs on in silence’ 
(p. 28). We reach here the deeper implication of Krapp’s 
identification with the tape recorder which, as we have just 
seen, Beckett, when directing the play, emphasized. Krapp 
wants to become one with the machine—to merge, that is, with 
reiterated memory—so that the effort of living is replaced by 
surrender to regret.  
Krapp’s contribution to his own predicament can be gauged 
by considering the remarkable moment when the present Krapp 
(aged 69) and a past Krapp (aged 39) share laughs regarding a 
Krapp from an earlier year:  
Hard to believe I was ever that young whelp. The voice! Jesus! 
And the aspirations! (Brief laugh in which Krapp joins.) And 
the resolutions! (Brief laugh in which Krapp joins.) To drink 
less, in particular. (Brief laugh of Krapp alone.) (p. 16)  
Sneers at what he calls his youth and thanks God that it’s over. 
(Pause.) False ring there. (Pause.) Shadows of the opus . . . 
magnum. Closing with a—(brief laugh)—yelp to Providence. 
(Prolonged laugh in which Krapp joins.) (p. 17)  
The key to understanding this shared laughter is to consider 
first the sole instance when only Krapp laughs: ‘Brief laugh of 
Krapp alone.’ The topic on that occasion concerns the 
resolution ‘[t]o drink less’. It is obvious that the younger Krapp 
still takes that resolution seriously, though he is unable to fulfill 
it. But in the years since then, Krapp has abandoned all his 
resolutions, and can laugh as readily at that one as at all the 
others. As Ruby Cohn observes, ‘The laughter is inspired by the 
futility of aspiration and resolution’.33 Similarly, Steven Connor 
argues that Krapp’s laugh alone ‘adds a layer of disillusion’.34 
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But as the end of the play suggests, this defeatist and weak-
willed attitude has the last laugh on Krapp.  
Perhaps a deeper implication of this laughter is indicated by 
the celebrated typology of laughter in Watt: ‘the bitter laugh’ 
which ‘laughs at that which is not good’; the ‘hollow laugh’ 
which ‘laughs at that which is not true’; and ‘the mirthless 
laugh’ which ‘laughs . . . at that which is unhappy’.35 
Ultimately, the laughter in Krapp’s Last Tape pertains to this 
third category: the laugh that ‘sneers’ (to use the younger 
Krapp’s term) at unhappiness—that is, at disappointment, 
surrender, lapse of will, and defeat. For the perfect defence 
against these calamities is to mock the suffering of them. Yet 
the deeper irony of Krapp’s laughter is that he shirks the effort 
to achieve happiness. It is much easier to cry about happiness 
lost, forfeited, or never achieved:  
Scalded the eyes out of me reading Effie again, a page a day, 
with tears again. Effie . . . (Pause.) Could have been happy 
with her, up there on the Baltic, and the pines, and the dunes. 
(Pause.) Could I? (p. 25)  
Krapp refuses to face his predicament in the present and take 
responsibility for his feelings about it. Through self-pitying 
regret, Krapp repudiates his present life, just as he repudiates 
and repudiated his past selves. His present suffering is never his 
fault. It can be blamed on the past, and the decisions made or 
avoided then. That is the ‘belief [he has] been going on all [his] 
life’ (p. 21).  
The irony of Krapp’s predicament can be further clarified. In 
an earlier phase, on the occasion of his ‘vision’ (p. 20), he 
believed in the ‘unshatterable association until my dissolution 
of storm and night with the light of the understanding and the 
fire’ (p. 21). On one level, Krapp has obviously failed to fulfill 
the promise of his vision; for his creative life never fructified. 
But on a more profound level, he did indeed fulfil the 
implications of his vision regarding the fusion of light and 
darkness. For through reducing his life to the agony of regret, 
he has inundated ‘the light of the understanding’ with 
anguished nostalgia, so that ‘the fire’ in him is now explicitly 
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linked with yearning for death: ‘drowned in dreams and 
burning to be gone’ (p. 25, my emphasis). At the moment of his 
spectacular vision, Krapp did not expect that this would be its 
result. But he never achieves recognition or anagnorisis 
regarding his plight. Just as he recognizes the problem of his 
‘bowel condition’ (p. 13), yet refuses to control the banana 
bulimia which aggravates it, so he recognizes the sense of 
‘misery’ (p. 26) which has always dogged his life, but refuses to 
take responsibility for its cause: obsessive-compulsive regret—
the need to define himself through ‘retrospect’ (p. 16). 
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